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Abstract 
The coordination of actors has been a major focus for much of the research in the disaster relief 
humanitarian logistics discipline. While much of this literature focuses on the initial response phase, 
little has been written on the longer term recover phase. As the response phase transitions into the 
longer term recover phase the number and types of actors change from predominantly disaster 
relief NGOs to more commercial entities we argue that humanitarian values should still be part of 
the rebuild phase. It has been noted that humanitarian actors both cooperate and compete at the 
same time (Balcik, Beamon, Krejci, Muramatsu and Ramirez, 2010), in a form of behavior that can be 
described as ‘co-opetition’ (Nalebuff and Brandenburger, 1996). We use a case study approach to 
examine an organizational model used to coordinate civil and commercial actors for the rebuild of 
the civil infrastructure for Christchurch, New Zealand following a series of devastating earthquakes 
in 2010/11. For the rebuild phase we argue that ‘co-opetition’ is a key behaviour that allows the 
blending of humanitarian and commercial values to help communities rebuild to a new normal. 
While at this early stage our contribution is limited, we eventually hope to fully elaborate on an 
organisational model that has been created specifically for the tight coordination of commercial 
actors and its relevance to the rebuild phase of a disaster. Examining the behaviour of co-opetition 
and the structures that incentivise this behaviour offers insights for the humanitarian logistic field. 
Key Words: Humanitarian logistics, coopetition, Christchurch earthquakes, disaster relief, SCIRT. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Rapid and effective response to a disaster event is absolutely critical. Typically, a large number and 
types of actors become involved in a disaster response effort such as international relief agencies, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), military, central and local government, communities and 
businesses. Organising such a diverse range of actors to achieve the central humanitarian objectives 
of alleviating human suffering is a daunting task. The problems of inter-agency coordination pre and 
post disaster are well known and indeed are exacerbated by their temporary nature (Balick, et al., 
2010). Coordination difficulties have been identified as one of the main issues for humanitarian 
logistics and disaster relief supply chains (Moore, Eng and Daniel, 2003; Rey, 2001; Tomasini and Van 
Wassenhove, 2009). Further, not only is there coordination issues at the vertical level of relief supply 
chain (i.e. from donor to disaster), but also at the horizontal level as well (two or more actors doing 
essentially the same things).      
While most of the humanitarian literature focuses on the initial response phase (Balcik, et al., 2010; 
Kunz and Reiner, 2012), the problems of actor co-ordination do not cease here. Indeed, humanitarian 
and disaster relief supply chain management go far beyond just the preparedness and early response 
phases. It is the long term rebuild phase that determines how successfully communities recover from 
an event and adapt to the ‘new normal’. Indeed, reconstruction is an important stage of disaster relief 
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for the long term sustainability of the disaster struck region for both economic and social reasons. A 
large-scale disaster will often substantially destroy infrastructure, such as roads, bridges and homes 
which means “reconstruction during the… final phase of rehabilitation could take years” (Van 
Wassenhove, 2006, p. 481). If reconstruction is delayed, left underfunded or uncompleted, then future 
mitigation and preparedness efforts will be compromised or worse, long term dissatisfaction with local 
leaders, authorities or NGO’s at the lack of progress may translate into unrest or even violence. Hence, 
tight coordination of actors at both the vertical and horizontal levels is critical for the recovery phase, 
and certainly for the long term economic recovery of the region (Horwich, 2000).    
As the disaster event evolves, the number and functions of NGOs, government and private sector 
actors involved in humanitarian logistics changes over time in response to the changing needs in 
theatre. Hence, the nature of the interorganisational coordination evolves, from command and 
control regimes necessary for the response phase, to a more collaborative one that we argue is more 
suited to the rebuild phase (Van Wassehove, 2006; Kovács and Spens, 2007). In many respects it is the 
quality of coordination that determines success in humanitarian logistics. Co-ordination mechanisms 
have been described as a set of methods used to manage interdependence between organisations (Xu 
and Beamon, 2006), yet we argue that coordination is more than just method. Rather, we focus on 
the nature of the behaviour that is used to coordinate actors. In particular, we argue that the concept 
of ‘co-opetition’ (Nalebuff and Brandenburger, 1996; Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Kotzab and Teller, 
2003; Barretta, 2008), drawn from management literature, could be an appropriate model for 
managing interorganisational relationships amongst humanitarian actors for the rebuild phase. Co-
opetition is an amalgam of ‘cooperation’ and ‘competition’ and seeks to explain how organisations 
can demonstrate both behaviours simultaneously. As the rebuild phase will include growing numbers 
of business entities, we seek a mechanism to explain both the commercial (competition) and 
humanitarian (cooperation) motives. As a behavioural doctrine, co-opetition has been argued to 
reduce the negative externalities of competition whilst creating synergies from cooperation (Barretta, 
2008). As NGO’s and other humanitarian agencies often compete for scarce resources, yet are still 
required to cooperate within theatre, then it could be worthwhile examining co-opetition as an 
explanatory model for inter-agency relationships. Research on the concept of co-opetition has 
progressed in business (Bengtsson, Eriksson and Wincent, 2010), yet we find virtually nothing in the 
humanitarian logistics field.  
The purpose of this paper is to offer insights from an organisational model utilised for the Christchurch 
(New Zealand) rebuild after a series of devastating earthquakes from 2010 to 2011. In particular, we 
examine the nature of the interaction found in the Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team 
(SCIRT) who are responsible, for what is known as, the ‘horizontal rebuild’ (ground level and below) 
of the city. This paper reports some preliminary findings only from an ongoing study. We have based 
these insights on interviews with the CEO of the rebuild agency and also three key managers from one 
of the prime contracting companies involved in the rebuild. We also include data from a wide range 
of public and secondary sources. The paper is organised as follows. First we discuss disaster relief 
phases and the nature of interorganisational relationships during the transition between phases and 
then focus on the little discussed long term rebuild phase. We examine the motives for coordination 
in the rebuild phase and then turn our attention to a preliminary case study of SCIRT, an organisational 
model used to coordinate a huge variety of actors involved in the rebuild of Christchurch City, New 
Zealand following a series of devastating earthquakes in 2010/11. We conclude with a discussion and 
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insights to the use of co-opetition as a suitable form of cooperation for the rebuild phase where 
commercial agencies predominate.    
 
THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Phases of Disaster Relief 
McFarlane and Norris (2006, in Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche and Pfefferbaum, 2008, p. 128) 
define disaster as "a potentially traumatic event that is collectively experienced, has an acute onset, 
and is time delimited; disasters may be attributed to natural, technological or human causes". 
Humanitarian logistics categorizes disasters to sudden-onset and slow-onset disasters (Van 
Wassenhove, 2006). Sudden-onset disasters unfold with little warning such as earthquakes and 
weather events, whereas slow-onset disasters evolve over time such as famines and drought (Van 
Wassenhove, 2006). In slow-onset disasters there is seldom a single disaster event, rather the crisis 
builds over time. The disaster event focused view of humanitarian logistics is emphasized by Day, 
Melnyk, Larson, Davis and Whybark (2012, p. 24) who states that "at the heart of any 
humanitarian/disaster relief system is the disaster, an event that forms the focal point around which 
all SCM activities are organized". We note that most of the humanitarian logistics literature in this 
emerging discipline focuses on sudden-onset disasters. 
The purpose of humanitarian logistics is to ‘aid people in their survival’ (Kovács and Spens, 2007), and 
it is concerned with the efficient management of flows of goods, information and services, to respond 
to the urgent needs of the affected populations under emergency conditions (Van Wassenhove, 2006; 
Kunz and Reiner, 2012). Humanitarian logistics literature can be divided into two mainstreams; 
disaster relief and continuous aid work (Kovács and Spens, 2007; Kunz and Reiner, 2012). In terms of 
phases of HDRSCM, while the terminology varies, a three phase model of disaster relief supply chains 
is the building block for more detailed analysis (Kovács and Spens, 2007, 2011; Altay and Green, 2006; 
Cozzolino, Rossi and Conforti, 2012). The basic phases are: 
1. Preparedness = preparation and prevention 
2. Immediate Response = emergency relief or transition 
3. Reconstruction = recovery and rehabilitation  
Kovács and Spens (2007, p. 200) develop this model further and offer a more realistic cyclical view of 
disaster relief, where the phases transition and ultimately flow back into the preparedness phase. 
Further, the phases of disaster relief can be labelled under pre-event and post-event categories 
(Tufekci and Wallace, 1998). According to this categorization, mitigation and preparation phase for a 
disaster takes place prior to a disaster event, whereas response and recovery are post-event phases. 
Table 1 below summarizes the purpose of each of the three phases, as well as some of the relevant 
activities within them. 
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Table 1: Three phase model and activities of disaster relief 
Phase: Preparation Immediate Response Recovery/Mitigation 
Purpose: Preparedness is used 
to avoid the gravest 
possible 
consequences of a 
disaster (Cozzolino, et 
al., 2012) 
In the response and 
recovery phases the 
preparedness 
strategy is put into 
action, that is, 
temporary structures 
are formed and 
activated (Jahre, 
Jensen and Listou, 
2009) 
Recovery involves the 
actions taken in the long 
term after the immediate 
impact of the disaster has 
passed to stabilize the 
community and to restore 
some semblance of 
normalcy. (Altay and 
Green, 2006) 
Examples of actions: 
(Altay and Green, 
2006) 
 
Planning, training, 
pre-positioning of 
supplies. 
Search and rescue, 
restoring emergency 
services, situational 
awareness 
Debris removal, making 
safe buildings, short term  
recovery transitioning 
into rebuild phase 
Command and 
Control Approach: 
Hierarchical 
Collaborative 
Centralised 
Authoritarian 
Distributed 
Collaborative/Competitive 
Duration: Pre-event First 7 days (approx.) Ongoing (multi-year) 
Infrastructure: Building in resilience Re-establishing basic 
services 
Repair and permanent  
rebuild > resilience 
Source: Authors 
 
Despite the intuitive logic of the three stage model, disasters are seldom discrete events and 
preparation is often spawned from an earlier response phase. As each country and region faces 
different hazards, it is logical that mitigation and preparedness efforts focus on the most likely 
scenarios. As Maon, Lindgreen and Joëlle (2009) point out, the different stages and activities of 
disaster relief may occur simultaneously, for example mitigation and reconstruction efforts should 
ideally be developed in parallel, though not necessarily by the same actors. Maon, et al., (2009) have 
suggested a dual-cycle model, where the ‘prevention and planning cycle’ and ‘reaction and recovery 
cycle’ circle around a disaster event. However, instead of viewing the three stages as a chain, the 
cyclical relation of the phases is emphasized (see Figure 1 below). This approach is further supported 
by Pettit and Beresford (2009) and Safran (2003). Thus, ideally, rehabilitation and reconstruction 
includes a learning element for further disasters to come, for example the installation of tsunami 
warning systems. Even if the dual-cycle model helps to more realistically depict the cyclic nature of 
disaster relief, the widely adapted three-stage model provides a clearer way to structure the 
literature, as well as the aspects of, humanitarian logistics and shall be referred to in the rest of the 
article. 
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Figure 1: The cyclical nature of disaster relief 
 
Adapted from: Kovács and Spens (2007) 
 
RECOVERY PHASE: ACTORS AND THE NEW NORMAL  
The Goal of the Reconstruction Phase 
The role, existence and importance of the recovery phase within disaster relief is non-debatable (Haas, 
Kates and Bowden, 1977). However, the recovery/rebuild phase has received little attention within 
the humanitarian and disaster relief supply chain management (HDRSCM) research. Despite the fields’ 
rapid growth in the last few years, most of the papers still focus on the response, or preparation 
phases. Kunz and Reiner’s (2012) review notes that only ten papers specifically address the 
reconstruction phase, confirming the findings of previous literature reviews that state there is a lack 
of studies on reconstruction phase (Altay and Green, 2006; Kovács and Spens, 2007; Overstreet, Hall, 
Hanna and Rainer, 2011). Indeed, most of the authors discussing the recovery phase in their articles 
do so in passing, only to point out its importance and draw its boundaries, in order to proceed to study 
the other phases of disaster relief (Maon et al., 2009; Van Wassenhove, 2006).  
Even if the most urgent needs of disaster-impacted population are answered in the response phase, 
disasters have also grave long-term consequences that need to be tackled in the recovery phase of 
the disaster relief. A disaster can wipe away the infrastructure, buildings, livelihoods and social 
stability of the impacted towns, cities and region. Beyond the personal tragedies, macroeconomic 
studies have found deleterious economic effects of a disaster, such as the deterioration of the 
country’s balance of trade, fiscal balances, an increase of poverty, and over time a widening of the 
income gap (Ibarrarán, Ruth, Ahmad and London, 2009). While both ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ countries are 
equally susceptible to natural disasters, the economic impact on each varies significantly with the poor 
being the most vulnerable (Ibarrarán, et al., 2009). It is axiomatic that the most vulnerable suffer the 
most and end up being the worst off after any disaster event, resulting in an increase of vulnerability 
and lack of resilience to future economic shocks. Hence, the aim of the recovery phase to is at least 
stabilize the community and restore some semblance of economic normalcy (Altay and Green, 2006). 
While economic recovery is important, it is not the only goal of the recovery phase. Indeed, the desired 
goal of the recovery phase calls for clarification. Community resilience research provides perspective 
on how communities function effectively and adapt successfully in the aftermath of disasters (Norris 
Disaster 
Event
Preparedness & 
Mitigation
Recovery
Response
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et al. 2008) and addresses especially the role of local people coping with the disaster. This stream of 
research provides many insights for disaster recovery, but the term ‘resilience’ itself is misleading. 
Originally ‘resilience’ was used in physics and mathematics to ‘describe the capacity of a material or 
system to return to equilibrium after a displacement’ (Norris et al., 2008; Bodin and Wiman 2004; 
Gordon, 1978), but disaster-struck regions rarely, if ever, bounce back to their former state. Rather, 
regions will hence ‘adapt’ to the new situation with the original system irrevocably changed (Boettke, 
Chamlee-Wright, Gordon, Ikeda, Leeson and Sobel, 2007). Implying that after a disaster the economy 
does recover, but not exactly to its previous form as it grows to fill the void left by the disaster. This 
was also emphasized by Horwich (2000) who states that the restored economy will not be a replica of 
the predisaster one. Further, in supply chain network theory Hearnshaw and Wilson (2013) term this 
rebounding as ‘adaptability’ and draw a clear distinction between resilience (returning it its former 
state) and adaptability (a recovery to a new form). While the previous refers to the economy, the core 
message holds true for the whole disaster-struck region. What emerges from the ashes is not a replica 
of the earlier state of affairs, rather it is a ‘new normal’. 
We argue then that the desired end state of the recovery phase is ‘the new normal’, and the ability of 
the disaster-struck region to reach the new normal is referred to as adaptability. Where the purpose 
of HDRSCM at large was to aid people in their survival (Kovács and Spens, 2007) the new normal is a 
state where the disaster-struck region is functioning effectively again. Clearly objectifying what the 
new normal looks like and when it transitions phases will be heavily case specific and relative to each 
region, culture and country. However, in the new normal the region is no longer strongly 
overshadowed by the past disaster and is able to draw the focus on mitigating and preparing for future 
disasters. Even if recovery and preparedness phases of disaster relief are entwined and a clear 
separation between the two is impossible, the new normal is the culmination or desired goal state of 
the recovery phase after which the preparedness phase can be seen to emerge again. 
Actor Transition in the Reconstruction Phase 
The logistical and supply chain actors present during the reconstruction phase have a strong impact 
on the success of the whole disaster recovery process, especially in terms of sustainability and long-
term effectiveness (Beamon and Balcik, 2008; Besiou, Stapleton and van Wassenhove, 2011; Kovács 
and Spens, 2011). While most of the papers on HDRSCM are response phase centred, they also focus 
more on the humanitarian sector NGOs. Rightfully, NGOs play a leading role in the academic literature 
as they do so in reality for the response phase. However, as the phase transitions to the recovery 
phase, most response focused NGOs have by then fulfilled their missions and redeploy to other 
theatres. The control that has hitherto been centralised then devolves to local authorities, agencies, 
businesses and community who take the lead in shaping their own futures (Balcik, et al., 2010; 
Dolinskaya, Shi and Smilowitz, 2011). We recognise that this sequence does not always happen as 
described in many post disaster theatres as power is often difficult to firstly, centralise, and then 
surrender. The funding of NGOs is often focused on the short-term relief hence when the media 
attention departs so do the NGOs before recovery/rebuild phase is even started (Gustavsson, 2003). 
There are legitimate reasons for this transition as philosophically the question is whether prolonged 
support from the humanitarian sector would help or hinder the disaster-struck region in rising back to 
its own feet. Further, we must ask the question if NGOs are the most appropriate actors to take the 
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lead for the rebuild phase? We argue that they are not due to dependency issues, but that 
humanitarian values should remain as a part of the ethos (motives) of the actors in the rebuild phase. 
Kovács and Spens (2007) argue that as the irregularities of demand and supply smooth out and the 
most urgent pain has been soothed, then the focus shifts to building toward the new normal. Here 
the purely altruistic and humanitarian motives slowly give way to more conventional business 
interests. Indeed, Kovács and Spens (2007) refer to the reconstruction phase as being very similar to 
a normal business logistics environment, though not aiming at generating profit. The skills demanded 
for the response phase (emergency logistics) are quite distinct from the response phases’ commercial 
logistics (Beamon, 2004). Hence, more and more tasks are allotted to businesses and local agencies 
who are more skilled at managing conventional supply chains that characterise the logistics of the 
rebuild phase. Further, transferring tasks to local business is also humanitarian in its own right as it 
helps the economic recovery and a sense of community ownership of the rebuild.  
If this transition is organic and smooth at local level then outside actors such as NGOs may have little 
to offer. Horwich (2000, p. 523) argues that the "…destruction of physical assets is a form of 
accelerated depreciation" that can be managed at the local level. In fact, external actor involvement 
might even hinder, leading to aid dependency in the worst case (Kovács and Spens, 2011). However, 
if the local government and business are not able to lead the disaster-struck region towards the new 
normal, then this could result in social instability as people choose to leave the dysfunctional region 
(Ibarrarán et al., 2009). In these cases the region could benefit from external actor involvement (such 
as central government), especially through the implementation of procedures, frameworks and 
funding that would fuel and stabilize the region's own recovery process. In any transition, there are 
four questions that need to be asked. Firstly, is the risk of aid dependency is still an issue? Secondly, 
will the limited resources of the NGOs be better deployed elsewhere? Thirdly, would the continued 
involvement of an external actor really be beneficial in this particular case? Finally, are the local 
organisations and business in a position to assume the lead in the rebuild? When NGOs and other 
external aid agencies do decide to withdrawal, a key issue is how to coordinate the transition and in 
what form is inter-organisational coordination going to take in the rebuild phase given the evolving 
power structures within the region.   
Coordination for the Recovery Phase 
Concepts of supply chain collaboration, cooperation, coordination and integration are used 
interchangeably (Jahre and Jensen, 2010; Fabbes-Costes and Jahre, 2008; van Wassenhove, 2006; 
Balcik et al., 2010). We adopt Balcik et al., (2010) use of the concept of ‘coordination’ to address the 
relationships and interactions among different actors operating within the relief environment. 
Whereas we see collaboration especially, but not only, as a strong intent to work together for a 
common cause. Hence, even if our concepts for collaboration and coordination overlap, collaboration 
facilitates coordination as the mentality that feeds the means. But what is the right form of 
coordination for the recovery phase? 
While it is axiomatic that the various actors involved in disaster relief, including governmental 
organizations, military, humanitarian sector and private businesses should collaborate and coordinate 
their actions with one another, they often do not. Yet in the humanitarian field it is the disaster and 
the desire to relieve human suffering that should provide a higher motive (McLachlin and Larson, 
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2011; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009). Coordination within disaster relief is seen as a means to 
reduce duplication of effort and to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the disaster relief 
operations (McLachlin and Larson, 2011; Schulz and Blecken, 2010; Thomas and Fritz, 2006). The 
outcome of collaboration between a variety of organizations within HDRSCM is generally positive, 
whereas lack of it has been increasingly critisized for wasting resources (Pettit and Beresford, 2009; 
Thomas and Kopczak, 2007; van Wassenhove, 2006). 
Successful collaboration and coordination comes with a price. Meetings, IT infrastructure and other 
means for enabling coordination and building trust consume resources. Especially in the response 
phase of disaster relief when time is crucial, the aid workers are overloaded and money is often scarce. 
(Balcik, et al., 2010; Tatham, 2012). To invest themselves in the coordination efforts, the actors 
involved need to believe that the benefits of coordination outweigh the costs. However, especially in 
the response phase the price tag does not translate to any currency, as humanitarian aspects override 
monetary ones (Pettit and Beresford, 2009). Furthermore, even if all actors of disaster relief aim at 
relieving human suffering, their mandates, ideologies and operational methods differ, causing friction 
(McLachlin and Larson, 2011; Balcik et al., 2010). Pettit and Beresford (2009, p 461) summarise the 
collaboration dilemma up by saying: 
"Overall, the question thus arises as to whether collaboration can ever exist in the same sense 
as it would in a commercial supply chain. Where supply chains are built rapidly in a crisis 
situation the need to develop effective collaboration is important. However, collaboration is 
about more than interfacing with other organizations and sharing information and resources, 
there is also the need to develop trust between various partners which allow the former to 
operate effectively. It involves establishing a relationship whereby partners have vested 
interest in sharing benefits and costs through process integration. "  
Sudden onset disasters unravel fast without much warning and the mix of actors involved in the 
disaster relief, from international NGOs to local enterprises, is largely unknown prior to the event and 
collaboration often only occurs once a crisis is unfolding and it is then much more difficult to optimise. 
Indeed, Tatham and Kovács (2010) argue for the application of ‘swift trust’ to assist in the early 
generation of collaboration. The big NGOs are often the common nominator or lead agency (McLachlin 
and Larson, 2011) in the immediate response phase of disaster relief, and much of the coordination 
literature within HDRSCM has focused around; horizontal NGO-NGO relationships (Jahre and Jensen, 
2010), NGO-Corporate cooperation (Binder and White, 2007), as well as NGO-Community 
collaboration (Patterson, Weil and Patel, 2010). 
However, when the immediate response turns into recovery phase and NGOs fade to the background 
or leave and the role of the military and national governments decreases, it is the local institutions 
and private sector that must take the lead on the way to the new normal. The milieu of the actors 
present in the recovery phase is presented in the Figure 2 and it is likely to bear a high resemblance 
to the milieu before the disaster, being specific to each area or region (Horwich, 2000). The recovery 
phase should not be run solely by the commercial laws of supply and demand. The disasters tend to 
have the gravest impact on the lives of those worst off before the disaster (Ibarrarán, et al., 2000) and 
humanitarian considerations should be present in the recovery phase to correct the balance on the 
way to the new normal. As an example, if construction companies would focus on bidding against each 
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other for restoring the wealthiest neighbourhoods and leave the worst hit, poor neighbourhoods for 
themselves, this would not only be non-humanitarian, but also undermine the social stability of the 
region. 
Institutions, such as the local government, play a substantial role in steering the disaster-struck region 
to the new normal along humanitarian principles and facilitating cooperation among the actors in the 
recovery phase (Boettke et al., 2007; Izadkhah and Hosseini, 2010). However, they must now rely on 
commercial entities rather than NGOs’ to deliver the rebuild. Most of the literature on private sector’s 
involvement in HDRSCM revolves around NGOs and the response phase where companies engage 
with NGOs for both commercial and philanthropic relationships (Balcik et al., 2010). In the recovery 
phase motivations to cooperate change somewhat shifting from the humanitarian to the commercial. 
Nevertheless, the reality is that motivations to cooperate are always difficult to untangle from the 
surrounding context, being a mix of humanitarianism, corporate social responsibility, commercial 
return, and legitimacy seeking. Whatever the reason, high levels of tight coordination around rebuild 
activities is essential, especially given the greater level of public scrutiny such relationships are 
subjected to in a stabilised region. Finally, if cooperation is essential, and private sector businesses are 
at the heart of the rebuild phase, how best do we organise to generate the right incentives for 
cooperation to flourish organically?  
 
CASE STUDY: CO-OPETITION AND THE REBUILD 
Christchurch Earthquakes 2010/11: The Research Context 
This research was conducted in Christchurch, New Zealand after the city, with a pre-earthquake 
population of 330,000, suffered a series of devastating earthquakes between 2010 and 2011. 
Christchurch would be considered a modern ‘first world’ city with a good public services and 
governance, a strong regulatory environment and sound building practices and codes. The first 7.1 
magnitude earthquake struck at a shallow depth of 10 kilometres on 4th September 2010 within 40 
kilometres of the city causing significant damage but no direct causalities. However, another 6.3 
magnitude earthquake1 struck directly under the city on the 22 February 2011 at a very shallow 
depth of 5.3km resulting in violent shaking and a maximum peak ground acceleration (PGA) of 2.2g 
(i.e. 2.2 times the acceleration of gravity) being one of the highest ever ground accelerations 
recorded in the world. This earthquake struck at 12.51pm, lunch time on a busy working day killing 
185 people and causing significant damage to the city and the eastern suburbs, especially the central 
business district (CBD) where 80-90% of the buildings have had to since be demolished. The damage 
was exacerbated by the buildings and infrastructure being already weakened from the initial 7.1 
magnitude earthquake five months prior. With large parts of the city being built on silt loam and 
sandy soils, liquefaction was a significant problem and over 510,000 tonnes of sand/silt had to be 
removed from the city (Christchurch City Council, Dec 2011). The liquefaction caused significant 
ground movement and underground pipes became positively buoyant. Hence, the damage to the 
city’s infrastructure was exceptional with 80% of the city’s water and sewerage system being 
destroyed (Clifton, 2011). The cost to insurers was initially estimated to be NZD15 billion (Murdoch 
                                                          
1 Technically an aftershock from the 4th September 2010 earthquake. 
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and Fraser, 2011), but has since been revised to NZD40 billion making it one of the costliest 
earthquakes in human history (3 News, April 2013). Four months later the city experienced 6.3 and 
5.7 magnitude earthquakes on the 13th June 2011, and also a 5.8 and 5.3 set striking on the 23rd 
December 2011 each causing more damage, injuries and liquefaction. To date, the city and region 
has experienced well over 14,000 aftershocks (Nicholls, 2014). Since most of the damage and all the 
185 lives were lost in the 22nd February earthquake, we will focus on this event as the crisis trigger. 
However, the ongoing significant earthquake swarms lasting over the next 18 months have caused 
considerably more damage and disruption to response and rebuild efforts.  
The response phase after the 22nd February magnitude 6.3 earthquake lasted a little over seven days 
and then the attention switched to the recovery/rebuild phase. While, the early response phase is a 
rich research area in itself, it is outside the scope of this paper. Early in the recovery phase, there 
was a dawning realisation that the rebuild would be massive and well beyond the capabilities and 
resources of any one organisation or business. The damage to the horizontal infrastructure (ground 
level and below) was unprecedented and totalled 300 kilometres of sewer pipes, 124 kilometres of 
water mains, 895 kilometres of road (52% of the total), and in addition over 50,000 individual road 
faults (for example cracks, bridge support displacements) (Christchurch City Council, Dec 2011, p. 
11). It was clear that the asset owners and local authorities had to prioritise their effort and develop 
a detailed programme to rebuild the city’s infrastructure. Not long after, a broad outline plan was 
developed by the Chrischurch City Council and this sat alongside other works streams, but the 
question was who was going to coordinate this massive task of rebuilding the horizontal 
infrastructure?  
We have previously noted the rich research environment of these earthquake and the relevance of 
the phases of disaster relief operations. However, we narrow our focus to the horizontal 
infrastructure rebuild (all city services ground level and below), and in particular to the organisation 
that has evolved to coordinate the recovery/rebuild phase of this disaster. Hence, the structure, 
function and performance metrics of Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT) and 
how that is translated into inter-organisation cooperation is what is of interest for this paper. Our 
focus and space constraints preclude the development of a full case study methodology just yet. As 
such, we base our study on a number of interviews with key informants within SCIRT, the CEO, one 
of the five key contractors, an analysis of a number of key documents, agreements, contracts and 
also material available in the public arena. We start by outlining briefly the history of SCIRT and 
examine this for humanitarian motivations and also the development cooperation amongst the 
actors in the rebuild phase. We believe that the structure of inter and intra organisational 
cooperation that has developed between SCIRT and its five prime contractors is an example that 
could potentially inform cooperation for the rebuild phase of humanitarian logistics.  
A Model for Rebuilds: The Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT) 
After the first earthquake in September 2010 the infrastructure response and recovery phases were 
managed locally by Christchurch City Council who set up their own Infrastructure Rebuild 
Management Office (IRMO). The IRMO was staffed by the Council personnel and was tasked with 
assessing and planning the rebuild of the city’s horizontal infrastructure. The intent was to contract 
the work to CCCs own City Care Department, and in addition, to the four major commercial 
construction companies of Fulton Hogan, Downer, McConnell Dowell and Fletcher Construction. 
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These contractors were still held at arms-length typical of local government procurement 
methodologies pre-earthquakes. Some remedial and rebuild progress was made, however the 
second major earthquake in February 2011 caused much greater damage as previously described. 
Those involved with the IRMO realised that the task was now significantly more complex and beyond 
their capabilities. A key question was how best to structure and organise all the various actors 
involved in the rebuild phase that included, government, military, NGOs, councils, communities and 
businesses? This is a classic challenge for all humanitarian efforts. 
Realising the scale of the rebuild phase, and how politically vital it was that it be seen to be managed 
effectively and at pace2, the National Government created the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery 
Authority (CERA) on the 29th March 2011 by an Act of Parliament (CER Act, 2011). CERA would be the 
agency that would lead the earthquake recovery and was tasked with cooperating with the central 
government, the local councils, businesses and residents. The powerful agency was anticipated to 
last five years and its mandate was to include all aspects of the rebuild including the horizontal 
infrastructure. The Government has also agreed to subsidise the cost of this infrastructure rebuild up 
to NZD1.8 billion, 60% of all the valid costs of fresh water system and also 83% of all roading costs 
(through the New Zealand Transport Authority - NZTA) (CERA, Jun 2013). CERA is effectively the 
governing authority for the rebuild with powers to set aside any law or regulation and works closely 
with the Christchurch City Council (CCC). Other agencies such as SCIRT are responsible for the design 
and operational aspect of the rebuild. The structure of the relationship between the Government 
(Crown), Christchurch City Council, CERA and its operational partners is illustrated in Figure 2 below. 
Of interest is the deliberate establishment of a buyer/seller relationship between CERA and the 
operational agencies of SCIRT and the Christchurch City Council. The intent of this structure was to 
ensure the best service delivery of the rebuild and a “need to transition to a value-for-money 
environment” (CERA, June 2013, p. 9). A key part of the agreement is that cooperation be explicit in 
all relationships by using such clauses as “1.1.1. Open, frank, honest, prompt, fair and consistent in 
all dealings with each other” (p. 2). While ostensibly an arms-length buyer/seller arrangement, 
operationally it works as a form of alliance between CERA, CCC, NZTA, SCIRT and the five major 
construction companies seconded to SCIRT. 
The Origins of SCIRT – Humanitarian and Commercial Motivations 
In the case of horizontal infrastructure rebuild, something unusual happened. As the initial damage 
assessments were made it was clear that the rebuild would become the biggest civil construction 
project in the history of New Zealand (Steeman, Oct 2013). It was quickly realised by the authorities 
and some key construction companies that the task would exceed their capacities at almost every 
level, including construction plant and equipment, civil engineers, design staff, and trades people. 
About 2 weeks after the February 2011 earthquakes, the New Zealand Transport Agency was 
charged with being the lead agency to coordinate the horizontal rebuild. There was also a flurry of 
high level calls between the CEO’s and Directors of the five major construction companies, the 
Christchurch City Council, NZTA, CERA and the Government about how best to coordinate the 
recover. The case study interviews indicate a strong empathy toward the suffering of the people of 
Christchurch and the humanitarian desire was strong. Indeed, strong enough in the initial stages at 
                                                          
2 There was a general election in 2011 (actually held on the 26th November 2011) that returned the National 
Government, some say on the basis of their handling of the Christchurch Earthquakes.  
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least to overcome any form of commercial motive. Prior to the earthquakes these five construction 
companies were arch competitors. That they have put aside this natural competition to cooperate 
on the rebuild is remarkable and, we argue, would not have happened without humanitarian values 
and some empathy toward human suffering. The rebuild situation was assessed as (SCIRT 
Presentation, March 2014): 
 Biggest rebuild/construction programme in New Zealand history 
 Damage and scope not fully known 
 Very high levels of uncertainty and risk 
 Urgent need to respond and start the rebuild effort 
 Logistics of daunting complexity 
 Need to deliver and demonstrate commercial value over the longer term 
 Need to adopt ‘whole of government’ approach and absorb existing relief efforts 
Hence, an ‘alliance’ approach was developed and central coordinating agency charged with 
implementing the programme of works for the horizontal infrastructure rebuild was formed. An 
interim Alliance Agreement was signed on the 4th May 2011. Later the Stronger Christchurch 
Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT) assumed full responsibility from Council’s IRMO on 31st August 
2011. The above ground rebuild of commercial and residential buildings and council facilities were 
incorporated into another stream of work and is outside the scope of SCIRT remit.  
SCIRT did not exist before the earthquakes, nor did it evolve from any other existing organisation. 
The entire organisation was constructed from scratch and in an incredibly short time period May – 
August 2011. Designing an effective organisation quickly from nothing is a difficult task, yet it also 
provides a unique opportunity to set in place the desired organisational culture and ethos from the 
outset. Staff inductions emphasised the need for high levels of cooperation, cross-functional 
integration and any leaving behind any previous company loyalty (Interview data). One manager 
reports that the culture revolves around "everybody's in this together" emphasising that, no matter 
your parent company background, everyone must do their best for the rebuild (Steeman, 2013; 
Personal Interview Communication 2013). The mission statement developed for SCIRT is as follows: 
“Creating resilient infrastructure that give people security and confidence in 
the future of Christchurch”  
The humanitarian need to work hard for the devastated city and its people where key motivational 
factors (Steeman, 2013). This lead to a general understanding of the need for high levels of 
cooperation yet set in a commercial environment where services were being contracted to 
competing construction companies.   
Structure and Function 
SCIRT currently functions under the governance oversight of the Horizontal Infrastructure 
Governance Group, chaired by a Government representative (as noted in Figure 2 below). This 
Governance group is made up of representative of the three key funding agencies, CERA, 
Christchurch City Council and the New Zealand Transport Authority (NZTA). SCIRT, being the 
organisation that is relevant to our study, sits under this governance group as a ‘supplier’ of services 
to these agencies. SCIRT operates under its own board that comprises three representatives from 
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the funding agencies, and five representatives from each of the five lead construction companies, 
City Care, Fulton Hogan, Downer, McConnell Dowell and Fletcher Construction. While the 
relationships are based on a buyer/seller arrangement, this level of inter-agency re-presentation at 
board level is significant for the development of cooperation (Stewart, Kolluru and Smith, 2009). The 
SCIRT board oversees the delivery of the rebuild services to the Horizontal Infrastructure 
Governance Group and liaises with the three funding agencies.   
Figure 2: Organisational Structure and Functions of SCIRT in the Rebuild Phase 
 
 Adapted from: CERA/CCC Cost Sharing Agreement (2013), p. 9; SCIRT Presentation, Beneath The Hood: How 
SCIRT Works, March 2014. 
 
SCIRT itself is headed by a CEO and a senior management team called the Horizontal Infrastructure 
Management Team comprised of representatives of the three major client agencies and also high 
level representation from the five construction companies.  
The heart of SCIRT is the Integrated Services TEAM (IST) that employs 300 staff from 21 different 
consulting and engineering companys bringing together a wide variety of construction disciplines. 
Interestingly for our study, SCIRT does not directly employ anyone (Alchimie, March 2014), rather all 
staff are on secondment (employed, contracted) from their parent organisation. They come from the 
funding agencies of CERA, Christchurch City Council and New Zealand Land Transport agencies, as 
well as the five prime contracting firms and other discipline experts as required. This high level of 
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inter-company cross discipline integration has been instrumental in creating a culture of innovation 
and cooperation, especially driven by the need to do well for the community.       
The role of the IST is to design the rebuild projects, develop cost estimates (audited), monitor the 
standards of engineering compliance, design and build work, manage the environmental and 
community impacts of each project and report to key stakeholders. The IST designs discrete projects 
or parcels of work and cost estimates and then allocates (no tendering) these projects to the five 
prime contractors (Steeman, 2013). The five construction companies are guaranteed work and the 
removal of the tendering process greatly facilitates the formation of cooperation. These five 
contracting companies are responsible for delivering their allocated projects on time and within the 
estimated costs (Targeted Outturn Costs, TOC). The agreement with SCIRT stipulates that a minimum 
of 40% of the contracted work allotted to each of the five be subcontracted out. Currently, over 60% 
of the work is subcontracted (Steeman, 2013), meaning that revenue is shared out to local 
businesses thus supporting the recovering economy. One major difficulty is that many of the specific 
project costs are impossible to know prior to the commencement of the task due to the complex 
geology underlying the city and that the scale of the damage is often unknown.  
Performance Metrics and Incentive Clauses 
Critical to the development of cooperation in what is a competitive environment of the rebuild are 
the incentives that are established through the Key Performance Indicators (KPI’s) and the pain/gain 
payment model. The right incentives promote the desired behaviour and SCIRT have devolved a 
series of incentives linked directly to their performance metrics. These KPI’s have evolved as the 
rebuild progresses but focus mainly brining projects in under budget, within time frames, whilst 
ensuring quality and safety. As a project is scoped, designed and costed by SCIRT a ‘targeted outturn 
cost’ (TOC) is established, being the estimated cost of repair plus a fixed margin for the contracting 
construction companies profit and overheads. All five contracting companies have the same margins 
agreed under the alliance agreement with SCIRT. Actual payment is made to the five contracting 
companies using a three step (limb) process outlined in Table 2 below. The starting figure is the 
estimated Targeted outturn costs (TOC) worked out by the IST prior to allocating to the five 
construction companies.        
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Table 2: Payment Model – Three ‘Limbs’ 
Limb Payment Component Explanation 
Limb1: Actual Outturn Cost (AOC) Actual cost of delivering the project (at 
each milestone and end of project)  
 Plus  
Limb2: Profit and Corporate Overhead  
(margin) 
Agreed percentage margin as per 
alliance agreement (same for all five 
contractors) 
 Plus  
Limb3: Gainshare/Painshare  The difference between total TOC and 
total AOC for all projects is split 
between the client SCIRT and all five 
contractors, usually 50/50. 
Total: Plus/Minus payment to all 
contractors  
 
Source: Adapted from SCIRT Presentation, (SCIRT, March, 2014).  
 
It is interesting to see how these Limb payments establish incentives for the desired inter-
organisational behaviour. For the contractors, they are guaranteed to be reimbursed for their actual 
project costs and also their fixed margin and overhead expenses. What is variable is the 
gainshare/painshare of the equation. Here the actual costs (AOC) are compared to the targeted 
costs (TOC) and if the project comes in under budget, then the client (SCIRT) all five contractors 
share the windfall, while any cost overruns are also all shared between the client and contractors. 
These payments are progressive and are made during the course of the project comparing what has 
been spent to date with what the TOC says should have been spent.   
There is much more detail around how each Limb is calculated but this is outside the scope of our 
research at present. What is critical for the development of coopetition is the commercial incentives 
established thorough the gain/pain sharing agreement inherent in the Limb3 payments or 
deductions. Assuming that Limb3 costs/surplus are split 50/50 between the client SCIRT and the five 
contractors, there are modifications to this split based on other non-cost KPIs. The Limb3 payments 
are pooled and if one company’s share of the work falls due to poor performance, then its share of 
the pool falls proportionally. For example, if the KPI’s around health and safety injuries is poor for 
one contractor then the split is weighted against the offender decreasing their returns and the total 
pool for the others. Hence, if one contractor overruns the budget the total pool available for 
distribution for all contractors shrinks as well. One outcome is that this incentive structure could 
generate animosity between the five contractors with the other four applying undue pressure on the 
non-performer. However, it is reported that there have not been any serious disputes so far that 
have necessitated the intervention of the SCIRT Board (Alchimie, March 2014). Nevertheless, what 
has actually emerged is a strong incentive for all parties, including the client, to collaborate and 
share their ideas, innovations and resources to increase the total pool to be shared. This high level of 
collaboration within the SCIRT project has emerged between, what were traditionally, fierce rivals 
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prior to the earthquakes. Hence, while competitors, they have now become more overtly 
collaborators in a hybrid behaviour we argue is a form of coopetition. How this co-opetitive 
behaviour manifests itself will be a fascinating study, but again will be the subject of ongoing future 
research.       
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN LOGISTICS 
Co-opetition in the Recovery Phase 
Returning to our original research question, we asked in what form should cooperation take in the 
recovery phase of a disaster? As the phases of disaster relief transition from the response to the 
recovery phase we have noted that the mix of actors also changes (Balick, et al., 2010). As the recovery 
phase gathers pace many of the tasks are now undertaken by commercial entities whose motives may 
differ somewhat from a disaster relief NGO’s. Indeed, most humanitarian organisations use the terms 
coordination and collaboration interchangeably. As the goal of the recovery phase is to achieve a ‘new 
normal’ as fast as possible without wasting scarce resources, cooperation amongst actors is still as 
important as the response phase. Indeed, we have observe that cooperation in business is no different 
to cooperation in humanitarian logistics. What changes is the motivation to cooperate moving from 
philanthropic to commercial (Balcik, et al., 2010). It can be argued that as the response phase actors 
are predominantly disaster relief organisations they are strongly motivated by humanitarian values. 
When the recovery phase tasks are increasingly undertaken by commercial organisations, then 
commercial values will predominate and humanitarian logistics needs models that permit these. While 
humanitarian values are still important in the recovery phase, the behaviour morphs into a form of 
cooperation and competition enacted simultaneously by the same actors. In an attempt to explain this 
behaviour we borrow from management literature a term coined ‘co-opetition’ as a amalgam of 
cooperation and completion (Nalebuff and Brandenburger, 1996; Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Kotzab 
and Teller, 2003; Barretta, 2006). Figure 3 below illustrates these changing motivations.  
Figure 3: Forms of Co-operation in Phases of Disaster Relief  
     
Source: Authors 
At its broadest, co-opetition can be understood as the simultaneous cooperation and competition 
among actors within a similar context (Kock, Nisuls and Söderqvist, 2010). As the relationships 
between actors can exist on the vertical and horizontal planes at several levels at once, opportunities 
for both competition and cooperation are bound to exist. It is amongst the myriad of these 
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relationships that both cooperation and competition manifest. With its roots in Game theory (Nalebuff 
and Brandeburger, 1996), co-opetition captures the paradoxical behaviours of competitors sharing 
information and resources with others with whom they compete against. Co-opetition has been 
studied in a number or areas, for example; developing international opportunities for SME’s (Kock, et 
al., 2010), logistics service providers (Schmoltzi and Wallenburg, 2012), research and development 
networks (Schiavone and Simoni, 2011) and also in the Toyota automotive supplier networks (Wilhelm 
and Kohlbacher, 2011).  
Co-opetition is generally understood to manifest amongst actors at the same horizontal level within a 
network (Scholtzi and Wallenburg, 2012). The rationale for co-opetition is not to compete to divide 
up the market, but rather to cooperate to increase the size of the current market or create new 
markets so that all actors benefit. In humanitarian supply chains co-opetition could be understood as 
the desire to eliminate wastes and duplications and to make the scarce resources go further for the 
effected region. Yet, despite Nalebuff and Brandeburger’s (1996) high claims for the relevance of 
coopetition, it is rarely applied in practice. Further, there are virtually no references to co-opetition as 
a form of coordination mentioned in humanitarian logistics literature. Rather, efforts focus on either 
centralised or decentralised coordination (Dolinskaya, et al., 2011), coordination by either command, 
consensus or default (Donini, 1996) and coordinating mechanisms such as procurement alliances (Wild 
and Zhou, 2011; Balcik, et al., 2010). 
Indeed, humanitarian logistics literature is bereft of any form of organisational model that nurtures 
cooperation beyond the universal imperative to for actors to collaborate. As a rebuild phase 
progresses commercial incentives emerge as well as humanitarian ones as the number and type of 
actors involved change. The infrastructure rebuild is one of the biggest tasks and perhaps one of the 
most important of recovery phase a natural disaster. Certainly, quickly re-establishing sanitation, fresh 
water and clean food supply chains can greatly mitigate famine or the outbreak to diseases. But 
beyond that is the longer term recovery of the community and economy. As we have argued earlier, 
the adaptibility of a disaster struck region has an impact on what approach is most effective for dealing 
with the aftermath of a disaster to achieve the new normal optimally rather than sliding into aid 
dependency. During the rebuild phase local autonomy and ‘by-in’ from the local community and 
business is very important for a sense of ‘ownership; and wellbeing derived from active participation. 
Hence, deploying an organisational model such as has been developed by SCIRT is important to meld 
what where ex ante competitors into an ex post cohesive group of collaborators to deliver the massive 
task of infrastructure rebuild.  
Clearly, authoritative command and control forms of directed actor cooperation, while suitable in 
emergencies, will be untenable for the rebuild. Instead, actors in the rebuild phase engage for both 
humanitarian and commercial reasons. Indeed, philanthropic relationships occur when private sector 
companies support or collaboration with relief organizations in ways that do not include profit making. 
Thus, supporting Haigh and Sutton’s (2012) contention that private enterprises engage to meet 
humanitarian stakeholder expectations. In the case of the Christchurch earthquakes, and the 
evolution of the alliance relationships that underpin the SCIRT model, we see a form of cooperation 
and also competition mixed in the same relationship. We have drawn from management literature 
the concept of co-opertition to explain the relationship observed in this model. The collaborative 
culture formed through the colocation of contracted personal throughout SCIRT and also the incentive 
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structure established by the KPI’s and Limb payments strongly foster collaborative actions that award 
the whole rather than the individual company self-interest. We argue that SCIRT offers a model that 
would be suitable to foster the right sort of co-opetatitve behaviour for the rebuild phase. However, 
we also acknowledge that this model, while working well for a well-developed democratic economy, 
may not be suitable in other contexts or countries. Our initial research, while pointing to some 
promising insights, will need more data gathering and analysis to confirm these early results, hence 
we advise caution in interpretation. We also argue that the recovery/rebuild phase of the disaster 
relief needs considerable more research and hope that our paper offers an addition to the thin 
literature base at present. Finally, while the recovery phase is not yet the new normal, for long term 
balance it makes sense to integrate humanitarian values into the commercial participation during the 
rebuild phase of disaster relief supply chains. We offer co-opetition as the most suitable form of 
cooperation to achieve this.   
 
References 
3 News. (28 April, 2013). Christchurch rebuild to cost $10b more. Retrieved 28 April, 2013: 
http://www.3news.co.nz/Christchurch-rebuild-to-cost-10b-
more/tabid/1607/articleID/295810/Default.aspx  
Alchimie, (24 March, 2014). Our work: Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team ('SCIRT'). 
Retrieved 24 March 2014 from: http://www.alchimie.com.au/index.php/home/our-
work/stronger-christchurch-infrastructure-rebuild-team-scirt 
Altay, N., and Green III, W. G. (2006). OR/MS research in disaster operations management. European 
Journal of Operational Research, 175(1), 475-493. 
Balcik, B., Beamon, B. M., Krejci, C. C., Muramatsu, K. M., and Ramirez, M. (2010). Coordination in 
humanitarian relief chains: Practices, challenges and opportunities. International Journal of 
Production Economics, 126(1), 22-34. 
Barretta, A. (2008). The functioning of co-opetition in the health-care sector: An explorative analysis. 
Scandinavian Journal of Management, 24(3), 209-220. 
Beamon, B.M. (2004), "Humanitarian relief chains: issues and challenges", Proceedings of the 34th 
International Conference on Computers & Industrial Engineering, San Francisco, CA, USA. 
Beamon, B., and Balcik, B. (2008). Performance measure in humanitarian relief chains. International 
Journal of Public Sector Management, 21(1), 4-25. 
Bengtsson, M. and Kock, S. (2000). Coopetition in business networks: To cooperate and compete 
simultaneously. Industrial Marketing Management, 29(5), 397-412. 
Bengtsson, M., Eriksson, J., and Wincent, J. (2010). Co-opetition dynamics: An outline for further 
inquiry. Competitiveness Review, 20(2), 194-214. 
20 
 
Besiou, M., Stapleton, O. and Van Wassenhove, L.N. (2011). System dynamics for humanitarian 
operations. Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management, 1(1), 78-103. 
Binder, A. and White, J.M. (2007). Business engagement in humanitarian relief: key trends and policy 
implications (1-44): Humanitarian Policy Group of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). Hpg 
Background Paper. London, United Kingdom.  
Bodin, P., and Wiman, B. (2004). Resilience and other stability concepts in ecology: Notes on their 
origin, validity, and usefulness. ESS Bulletin, 2, 33-43. 
Boettke, P., Chamlee-Wright, E., Gordon, P., Ikeda, S., Leeson, P. T., and Sobel, R. (2007). The Political, 
Economic, and Social Aspects of Katrina. Southern Economic Journal, 74(2), 363. 
CERA (June, 2013), Cost Sharing Agreement. Schedule 1 Horizontal Infrastructure Costs, pp. 1-21.  
Retrieved 23 Jan 2014: http://cera.govt.nz/sites/cera.govt.nz/files/common/cera-crown-ccc-
cost-sharing-agreement-2013-12-05.pdf  
Christchurch City Council (December, 2011), Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Plan: How 
we Plan to fix our Earthquake Damaged Roads and Underground Services. Christchurch City 
Council Report, pp 1-17.  
Clifton, C. (March, 2011). The Christchurch Feb 22nd earthquake: A personal report’. New Zealand 
Heavy Engineering Research Association. Retrieved 10 March 2011: 
http://www.hera.org.nz/Story?Action=View&Story_id=1398 
Cozzolino, A., Rossi, S. and Conforti, A. (2012). Agile and lean principles in humanitarian supply chain. 
Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management, 2(1), 16-33. 
Day, J. M., Melnyk, S. A., Larson, P. D., Davis, E. W., & Whybark, D. C. (2012). Humanitarian and disaster 
relief supply chains: A matter of life and death. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 48(2), 21-
36. 
Dolinskaya, I.S., Shi, Z., and Smilowitz, K.R. (2011). Decentralized approaches to logistics coordination 
in humanitarian relief. Proceedings of the 2011 Industrial Engineering Research Conference 
(IERC), Reno NV, May 2011. 
Donini, A. (1996). The policies of mercy: UN coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda. 
The Watson Institute for International Studies, USE: Providence.  
Fabbe-Costes, N. and Jahre, M. (2008). Performance and supply chain integration: A review of the 
empirical evidence. International Journal of Logistics Management, 19(2), 130-154. 
Gordon, J. (1978). Structures. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books. 
Gustavsson, L. (2003), "Humanitarian logistics: context and challenges", Forced Migration Review, 18, 
6-8. 
Haas, J., Kates, R. and Bowden, M. (1977), Reconstruction following disaster, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
MA. 
21 
 
Haigh, R., and Sutton, R. (2012). Strategies for the effective engagement of multi-national construction 
enterprises in post-disaster building and infrastructure projects. International Journal of Disaster 
Resilience in the Built Environment, 3(3), 270-282. 
Hearnshaw, E. J. S., and Wilson, M. M. J. (2013). A complex network approach to supply chain network 
theory. International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 33(4), 442-469. 
Horwich, G. (2000). Economic lessons of the Kobe earthquake. Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, 48(3), 521-542. 
Ibarrarán, M. E., Ruth, M., Ahmad, S., & London, M. (2009). Climate change and natural disasters: 
Macroeconomic performance and distributional impacts. Environment, Development and 
Sustainability, 11(3), 549-569. 
Izadkhah, Y. O., and Hosseini, M. (2010). Sustainable neighbourhood earthquake emergency planning 
in megacities. Disaster Prevention and Management, 19(3), 345-357. 
Jahre, M., Jensen, L.M., and Listou, T. (2009). Theory development in humanitarian logistics: A 
framework and three cases. Management Research News, 32(11), 1008-1023. 
Jahre, M., and Jensen, L.M. (2010). Coordination in humanitarian logistics through clusters. 
International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 40(8/9), 657-674. 
Kock, S., Nisuls, J., and Söderqvist, A. (2010), Co-petition: A sources of international opportunities in 
Finish SMEs. Competitiveness Review: An International Journal, 20(2), pp. 111-125.   
Kotzab, H., and Teller, C. (2003). Value-adding partnerships and co-opetition models in the grocery 
industry. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management. 23(3), 268-281. 
Kovács, G., and Spens, K. M. (2007). Humanitarian logistics in disaster relief operations. International 
Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management, 37(2), 99-114. 
Kovács, G., and Spens, K. M. (2011). Trends and developments in humanitarian logistics: A gap 
analysis. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 41(1), 32-45. 
Kunz, N., and. Reiner, G. (2012). A meta-analysis of humanitarian logistics research. Journal of 
Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management, 2(2), 116-147. 
Maon, F., Lindgreen, A., and Joëlle, V. (2009). Developing supply chains in disaster relief operations 
through cross-sector socially oriented collaborations: A theoretical model. Supply Chain 
Management, 14(2), 149-164. 
McLachlin, R. and Larson, P.D. (2011). Building humanitarian supply chain relationships: lessons from 
leading practitioners. Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management, 1(1), 
32-49. 
Moore, S., Eng, E., and Daniel, M. (2003), International NGO’s and the role of network centrality in 
humanitarian aid operations: A case study of coordination during the 2000 Mozambique floods. 
Disasters, 27(4), pp 305-318. 
22 
 
Murdoch, S., and Fraser, A. (24 February, 2011). Disaster could cost insurance sector $12bn. The 
Australian. Retrieved 24 February 2011: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/disaster-
could-cost-insurance-sector-12bn/story-fn7ytpji-1226010988460 
Nalebuff, B. J., and Brandenburger, A. M. (1996). Co-opetition. Hammersmith, London: Harper Collins 
Business. 
Nicholls, P. (2014). Christchurch Quake Map. The University of Canterbury's Digital Media Group, 
Christchurch, New Zealand. Retrieved 22 Jan 2014: http://www.christchurchquakemap.co.nz/ 
Norris, F. H., Stevens, S. P., Pfefferbaum, B., Wyche, K. F., and Pfefferbaum, R. L. (2008). Community 
resilience as a metaphor, theory, set of capacities, and strategy for disaster readiness. 
Americam Journal of Community Psychology, 41(1-2), 127-150. 
Overstreet, R. E., Hall, D., Hanna, J.B. and Rainer, R.K. Jr. (2011). Research in humanitarian logistics. 
Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management, 1(2), 114-131. 
Patterson, O., Weil, F., and Patel, K. (2010). The role of community in disaster response: Conceptual 
models. Population Research and Policy Review, 29(2), 127-141. 
Pettit, S., and Beresford, A. (2009). Critical success factors in the context of humanitarian aid supply 
chains. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 39(6), 450-468. 
Rey, F. (2001). The complex nature of actors in the humanitarian action and the challenges of 
coordination. In Humanitarian Studies Unit (Eds), Reflections on humanitarian action: Principles, 
ethics and contradictions. London: TNI/Pluto Press. 
Safran, P. (2003). A strategic approach for disaster and emergency assistance, Proceedings of the 5th 
Asian Disaster Reduction Center International Meeting and the 2nd UN-ISDR Asian Meeting, 
Kobe, Japan, 15-17 January. 
Schiavone, F., and Simoni, M., (2011). An experience-based view of co-opetition on R and D 
networks. European Journal of Innovation and Management 14(2), pp. 136-154. 
Schmoltzi, C., and Wallenburg, C.M. (2012). Operational governance in horizontal cooperations of 
logistics service providers: Performance effects and the moderating role of cooperation 
complexity. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 48(2), pp. 53-74.  
Schulz, S. F., and Blecken, A. (2010). Horizontal cooperation in disaster relief logistics: Benefits and 
impediments. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 40(8/9), 
636-656. 
Steeman, M. (October, 2013). SCIRT awarded for two hard years. Retrieved 27 January 2014, 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/business/the-rebuild/9247628/Scirt-awarded-for-two-hard-
years 
Stewart, G. T., Kolluru, R., and Smith, M. (2009). Leveraging public-private partnerships to improve 
community resilience in times of disaster. International Journal of Physical Distribution & 
Logistics Management, 39(5), 343-364. 
23 
 
Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team, (March 2014). Beneath the hood: How SCIRT 
works. Presentation documentation.  
Tatham, P., and Kovács, G. (2010). The application of ‘swift trust’ to humanitarian logistics. 
International Journal of Production Economics, 126(1), 35-45. 
Tatham, P. (2012). Some reflections on the breadth and depth of humanitarian logistics and supply 
chain management. Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management, 2(2), 
108-111. 
Thomas, A., and Fritz, L. (2006). Disaster Relief, Inc. Harvard Business Review, 84(11), 114-122. 
Thomas, A., and Kopczak, L. (2007), Life-saving supply chains and the path forward, in Lee, H. and Lee, 
C.Y. (Eds), Building Supply Chain Excellence in Emerging Economies. Springer Science and Business 
Media LLC, London, pp. 93-111. 
Tomasini, R., and van Wassenhove, L. (2009). Humanitarian Logistics. United Kingdom: INSEAD 
Business Press / Palgrave MacMillan 
Tufekci, S, and Wallace, W.A. (1998). The emerging area of emergency management and engineering. 
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 45(2), 103-105. 
van Wassenhove, L. N. (2006). Humanitarian aid logistics: Supply chain management in high gear. The 
Journal of the Operational Research Society, 57(5), 475-489. 
Wild, N., and Zhou, L. (2011). Ethical procurement strategies for aid international non-government 
organisations. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 16(2), 110-127.  
Wilhelm, M.M., and Kohlbacher, F. (2011). Co-petition and knowledge co-creation in Japanese 
supplier-networks: the case of Toyota. Asian Business and Management, 10(1), pp. 66-86. 
Xu, L., and Beamon, B.M., (2006). Supply chain coordination and cooperation mechanisms: An 
attribute based approach. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 42(1), 4-12. 
 
 
